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Abstract: Third Generation (3G) wireless systems are expected to becom more and more popular
worldwide, thanks to a higher quality than in current 2G. Direct-sequence code-division multiple-
access (DS-CDMA) is a solution to be implemented in these systems but, due to a limited radio
spectrum and more and more demanding applications, it seemslikely that congestion will still be
a problem. Pricing appears a simple way to tackle this problem. This paper aims at studying the
impact of a per-packet static pricing scheme on the use of therev rse-link in a cell where demand
(defined through the so-called utility functions) decreases when prices increase or quality of service
decreases. The paper also deals with the pricing of multipleclasses, since DS-CDMA supports
integrated services. In a first step, we determine as a Nash equilibrium the number of customers
that will actually apply for service, depending on demand. Ia second step, assuming perfect power
control, we find the prices and received powers optimizing the service provider’s revenue. We find
that in the case where potential demand always exceeds capacity, the base station’s best interest is
to favor only one class, but that it is not the case in the more realistic situation when considering
potential demand as a random variable over time.
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Tarification statique optimale de la voix montante dans une
cellule DS-CDMA avec trafic h́etérogène
Résuḿe : Les systèmes de transmission sans fils de troisième génération (3G) deviennent de plus
en plus présent et offrent de meilleurs performances que l’actuel 2G. L’accs multiple par division
de code et séquence directe (DS-CDMA) est une solution qui doit être implémenter dans de tels
systèmes de communication mais, à cause de la limitation du spectre radio et de l’émergence de
nouvelles applications de plus en plus demandeuses en débit, il semble que la congestion dans ce
type de systèmes restera un problème. Appliquer un modèle de tarification semble une solution
simple pour résoudre ce problème. L’idée de cet article est d’étudier l’impact d’un modèle de tar-
ification à l’usage statique par paquet sur la voix montantedans une cellule d’un réseau sans fils.
Nous considérons que la demande (définie àl’aide des fonctions d’utilité) décroit quand les prix aug-
mentent ou quand la qualité de service diminue. Cet articletraite également d’une tarification avec
trafic hétérogène car la technologie DS-CDMA supporte l’intégration de services. Tout d’abord,
nous déterminons par un équilibre de Nash le nombre d’utilisa eurs rejoignant le système en fonc-
tion de la demande. Ensuite, supposant un contrôle de puissance parfait, nous déterminons les prix
et puissances de réception qui optimisent le revenu du fournisseur de service. Nous montrons que
lorsque la demande excède toujours la capacité, le fournisseur maximise son revenu en servant une
seul classe de service. Seulement, ceci n’est pas vraie dansle ca plus réaliste de demande aléatoire
dans le temps.
Mots clés : Tarification, Réseaux sans-fils CDMA, Optimisation
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1 Introduction
With the widespread use of the Internet, telecommunications are nowadays of common use in our
daily life. Moreover, the Internet is expected to converge into a single network with heterogeneous
networks, like wireless and cable networks. Due to this convergence and new emerging applications
such as multimedia, the network will deal with services witha large range of quality of service (QoS)
requirements. This is combined with an increasing number ofsubscribers, each of them demanding
a particular bandwidth. If the user demand is below network capa ity, like in the Internet backbone,
then congestion would not occur and there would be no specialneed for applying service differen-
tiation since all QoS requirements would be likely satisfied. On the other hand, in access networks
in general (where the problem is often called thelast mile problem[2]), and in wireless commu-
nications in particular, capacity (the radio spectrum for wireless communications) will be hardly
increased, and the growing demand needs to be managed in a waythat “most” of demands are satis-
factorily served. In this situation, it seems important to apply control and/or service differentiation
procedures. In this paper, we focus on direct-sequence code-division multiple-access (DS-CDMA)
networks that will form the next generation of wireless networks. DS-CDMA ([9, 26]) is indeed a
way to control QoS, by appropriately selecting the transmision (meaning received) powers, which
can be increased when the interference increases in order tosatisfy the requested signal qualities. We
consider the case of integrated services, that are supported in DS-CDMA, where multiple classes of
service are provided (through different prices and received powers at the base station). We assume
perfect power control at the base station, which is known to be crucial especially for the reverse-link
[7, 21]: all signal powers of mobile users received at the base station are thus forced to be equal
within a given class, avoiding near-far effects for instance.
Many papers have been devoted to power allocation and QoS management [18, 10, 11, 12, 13].
In these works, resource allocation schemes are proposed toprovide the best possible QoS levels to
clients, but they do not look at practical ways of controlling demand. To tackle out this problem,
pricing is a simple and convenient approach. Pricing has been extensively studied in wired networks
such as the Internet (see [3, 4, 5, 25] and the references therein) for controlling congestion and for
differentiating services. It has also been used in CDMA networks ([1, 14, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24]) by
using their specificities: the price charged to a user is computed in terms of the QoS degradation the
presence of this user imposes to others the so-called externali y. This can be shown to directly depend
on the transmission powers through the interferences. Thisgenerally leads to a game-theoretical
analysis and price optimization.
We consider in this paper a different view of CDMA network contr l where prices do not depend
on power or interference levels, but simply on the volume of transmitted data. Since in the scheme
we propose prices do not integrate thereal externality, it might be seen mathematically less efficient
in terms of fairness or social welfware. However, we believethat such a volume-based pricing
scheme will be more likely accepted by subscribers since it is more predictable. Also, we look for
a static pricing scheme, where prices are fixed and do not vary with thenetwork conditions. This
is assumed for the same reasons, since again, we argue as in [17] that users would prefer to have
ana-priori knowledge of the applied charge rather than a dynamic and random one, even if this is
larger in average.
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We thus consider a pricing mechanism to optimize the networkrevenue in reverse-link DS-
CDMA transmissions. The model we propose is inspired by the on in [10], where an optimal
resource allocation scheme was obtained among different classes of users, but for fixed and pre-
determined numbers of users in each class. In that paper, power is controlled to reach the given
thresholds of signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) for which QoS requirements are met. A
processing gain exhibiting good performance is computed. We consider here that the processing gain
is fixed for each class of service, but on the other hand we compute the received powers allowing to
optimize the network revenue. Our goal, with respect to [10], is to study how pricing can be used
to control the number of users in the network and how, by meansof pricing and received powers,
the provider’s revenue can be optimized. The introduction of demand with respect to prices and per-
ceived QoS levels is obtained by introducing the so-called utility functions. These functions depend
on both the QoS parameters and prices. QoS parameters vary with the type of traffic considered, for
instance data is sensitive to delay, while voice is rather sensitive to losses and throughput, if delay
is bounded. The better the quality, the more users will access the network, but the higher the prices,
the less users will likely enter the network. We thus look at this rade-off as well as the trade with
received power. With respect to [10], for dynamic range limitation on the multi-access receiver, we
also introduce a capacity constraint representing the factth t only a finite number of customers can
be received at the base station, this number depends on the reception power level [26]. The pricing
problem is investigated when one or two different classes oftraffic are involved. We consider situa-
tions where demand always exceeds capacity, but also cases where demand is random. The random
case catches, for instance, the demand behavior over a full day since demand could be under capacity
at some point of time. At a given time, we look for an equilibrium situation where demand adapts
itself to prices and to received power requirements. Then, we look at prices and powers optimizing
the provider’s revenue.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describethe basic model taken from [10],
and then describe how demand varies with QoS and prices by using tility functions. Section 3
describes the case of a single class of users and Section 4 does the same analysis but in the case
of two classes. Special attention is devoted to the equilibrium situation, especially for two classes,
where users of both classes of traffic compete for resources.W consider the case where demand
exceeds capacity, but also the case where potential demand my be under capacity. Finally, we
conclude and give our directions for future research in Section 5. Proofs are left to appendices to
ease the understandig of results.
2 Model
2.1 CDMA Model
The model we propose is based on the one in [10]. We focus on thereverse link of a single cell. We
consider a DS-CDMA network (see [9, 26] for details), where th chip rateRc is assumed equal for
all users. We assume that we have a multiclass system, withC classes, where a user is characterized
by a classi. When packets are sent, they enter a buffer after error control coding through forward
error correction (FEC), and are converted to a DS-CDMA signal at symbol rateRc=Ni, with Ni
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being the processing gain (which should not be larger thanRc=(iLi). Li is the length in terms of
symbols of packet of classi. The signal transmission power is controlled such that it isreceived
at levelPi at the base station. The choice ofNi and received powerPi at the base station affects
packet delay and transmission rate. This has been extensively d scussed in [10]. Note that this also
affects the performance of other classes of users. So, we fix the values ofNi to the ones giving
good performance in [10]. We consider that a new packet is generated as soon as the preceding one
is successfully delivered. This is referred as continuously active users, which might represent the
transmission of long files for instance.
In DS-CDMA, a key parameter is the received signal-to-interference plus noise-ratio (SINR).
QoS metrics such as delay and bit error probability depend directly on it. For classi users, the SINR
is SINRi = PiNi PKi 1k=1 Pi +PCj 6=iPKjk=1 Pj+ 2 ; (1)
where is a constant which depends on the shape of DS-CDMA chips,Kj is the number of classj
connections and2 is the background noise power.
For all classes of traffic, we assume that channel coding includes forward error correction (FEC).
We assume that the bit error probability (BEP) is an exponentially decaying function of the SINR.
Specifically, we assume that for a user in classi, the BEP ispbi = F(SINRi); (2)
with F(x) = exp( x)1. Similarly, the probability of retransmission ispri = 1  [1 F(SINRi)]Liri (3)
with ri the FEC code rate for classi.
Performances measures can be directly expressed in terms ofthe SINR. Consider for instance
the mean packet delayIEDi for type-i traffic. It is composed of the mean waiting time in the queueIEWi and the mean retransmission timeIESi, IEDi = IEWi + IESi: It is shown in [10] thatIEDi = LiNiRc(1  pri) : (4)
On the other hand, base stations also have constraints on capacity. As stated in [26], for dynamic
range limitations on the multiaccess receiver and to guarantee system stability, the total received
noise plus interference power to background noise ratio is limited for a class-i user to PKi 1k=1 Pi +PCj 6=iPKjk=1 Pj+ 22  1 (5)
where is typically 0.25 or 0.1. This inequality provides an upper-bound on the number of users for
each class, for fixed received powers.
1In [10], a functionF(x) =  exp( x) is rather used, implying that the delay of transmission is bounded even if the
power is reduced to zero. To prevent this degenerated case, we adopt the approach used in [6], where = 1 so that the delay
of transmission is infinite and the probability of retransmision is equal to one when the power is zero.
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2.2 Modelling users’ behavior
Let the class indexi be infv; dg, wherev could be for voice traffic and for data. We abusively
use this notation to keep in mind that class-v is more sensitive to some QoS metrics (like delay) than
class-d. The index is simply skipped when only one class is considered.
In general, autility functionUi is associated with a user of classi (i 2 fv; dg), describing his
level of satisfaction when transmitting a packet. This utility function is expressed as the difference
between the value of the QoS level (depending on the SINR, which is function of the number of
users of each typeKv andKd) and the per-packet chargeui for classi:Ui(Kv;Kd) = fi(SINRi(Kv;Kd))  ui: (6)fi describes how the valuation for service evolves with the SINR.
Assumption 1 We assume that the valuation functionfi is strictly increasing, differentiable and
that is such thatfi(0) = 0 for all i 2 fd; vg.
We will specifically assume that the utility function for class-i traffic (i 2 fd; vg) depends on the
mean delay by Ui(Kv;Kd) = 1(IEDi(Kv;Kd))i   ui; (7)
wherei is the sensitivity parameter of class-i traffic to the mean delay (as considered in [15]) andIEDi(Kv;Kd) is given by (4). Note thatIEDi(Kv ;Kd) is a function ofSINRi(Kk;Kd) fitting
the above framework.
We assume, at least in a first step, that the number of potential sources is very large so that
demand exceeds capacity. Selfish classi u ers apply for service as soon as their utilityUi is positive.
Demand is thus directly controlled by prices and reception pwers, so that it potentially leads to a
(Nash) equilibrium on the number of active users where, for each class, either the number of sources
is zero with negative utility (meaning that no user has interest in participating), or is equal to capacity
with positive utility (meaning that no more users are allowed to enter for physical reasons), or the
number of sources is positive and less than capacity, with null utility (meaning that the users’ cost
reach their valuation and no other user has interest in entering, since it would lead to a negative
utility). Formally, an equilibrium is a tuple(Kv ;Kd) such thatKv ;Kd  0 and8i; j 2 fd; vg,j 6= i: EitherKi = 0 andUi(1;Kj ) < 0; or Ki has reached the capacity constraint (5) (so the inequality becomes an equality) andUi(Kv ;Kd) > 0; orKi > 0, under the capacity contraint (5), andUi(Kv ;Kd) = 0 so that no other user has an
incentive to join (a potentially leaving user being immediately replaced by a new one).
This leads to two different problems that we try to solve in the following sections:
Irisa
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(unique) equilibrium, especially when considering two different classes of users in competi-
tion? What are the prices and powers that the service provider at the base station should set in order
to maximize his revenue?
3 Optimal pricing for a single class of users
We consider in this section that the system has a single classof u ers. We first analyze the case
where demand always exceeds capacity, then the case where deman is random and may at some
point be under capacity. Recall that indexv or d is skipped in this section.
3.1 Demand exceeding capacity
We assume that demand exceeds capacity. So, there always areu ers wishing to apply for service
when their residual utility is positive. We first consider the case of a general utility function and then
the case of a typical function that depends on the mean packetdelay.
3.1.1 General utility function
With full generality, assume that the utility function of a user is expressed byU(K) = f(SINR(K))  u;
where functionf is positive, continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and is such thatf(0) = 0
(Assumption 1).
The following theorem gives the number of sources at equilibrium in terms of fixed price and
power.
Theorem 1 Let u be the per-packet price andP be the received power at the base station for all
users. The number of usersK at equilibrium is:K =8><>: 0; if u > umax = f(NP2 );1  2P   Nf 1(u) ; if f(NP2 ) < u < f(NP2 );1 + 1  2P ; otherwise:
The first and third cases are border situations: the first caseorr sponds to the situation where
access is too expensive for users, the third case to the situation where full power capacity is reached.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A.
With the number of sources determined, the second step is to look for per-packet price and
received power maximizing the revenue of the base station. This problem can be formalized asmaxu>0;P>0R(u; P ) = uK(u; P )(u; P ); (8)
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with (u; P ) the average throughput for each user andK(u; P ) the equilibrium number of sources
determined in the above theorem. The average throughput is the average number of bits successfully
transmitted per second, i.e.(u; P ) = LrIED(u; P )= rRcN 1  exp(  PN(K(u; P )  1)P + 2 )Lr : (9)
The following theorem gives the price and received power optimizing the base station revenue.
Theorem 2 LetX be the set of solutions of the following equation inX > 0:f(X)  X2Lre X +XN(1  )Lr  N(1  e X)+f 0(X)  X2(1  e X) +NX(1  e X) = 0: (10)
Let X = argmaxX2X rRcN (1  e X)Lrf(X) + 1   rRc (1  e X)Lrf(X)X :
Then the per-packet priceu and received powerP d that maximise the base station revenue areu = f(X) andP  = X2N :
The proof is in Appendix B.
3.1.2 Utility function depending on the average delay
Assume now more specifically that the valuation of users depends on the average delay as1(IED) (as
used in [8]). So, the utility isU(K) = 1IED  u: The functionf such thatf(SINR(K)) = 1(IED)
is f(x) =  RcLN (1  e x)Lr
from (3) and (4). Note that this function is positive, continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing
and is such thatf(0) = 0. Theorems 1 and 2 can be be restated as follows.
Corollary 1 Under the assumption that the utility function depends on the average packet delay: the number of usersK at equilibrium as a function of(P; u) isK = 8>><>>: 0; if u > umax; with umax = ( RcLN )(1  e NP2 )Lr:1  2P   N ln(1 LNRc u1=1=Lr) ; if ( RcLN )(1  e NP2 )Lr < u < ( RcLN )(1  e NP2 )Lr:1 + 1  2P ; otherwise:
Irisa
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)X2 + 1   Lr(1 + )NX + (1  )N = 1   NeX :
The optimal per-packet price is:u = ( RcLN )(1  e X)Lr;
and the optimal received power is: P  = X2N :
This result is proved in Appendix C.
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Figure 1: Revenue of the base station in terms of the per-packet price and the received power when
demand exceeds capacity and delay is the metrics of interest.
As a numerical example, we consider the following variables: L = 768 symbols,r = 1=2, = 2,  = 2=3 for rectangular chips,Rc = 5 Mchips/s,2 = 0:9 dB,  = 1:6 andN = 10.
We also consider the upper bound of the power ratio = 0:2. Corollary 1 gives the optimal per-
packet priceu = 0:4804 and the optimal received powerP  = 2:1352. The maximal revenue
is R = 411:699. The revenue is displayed in Figure 1 in terms of the per-packet priceu and the
received powerP ; it can be observed that this is in agreement with the optimization results.
3.2 Random demand
We assume in this subsection that demand varies so that, during a portion of time, it does not ex-
ceed capacity. Assume that demand is expressed by a discreterandom variable representing the
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number of potential users requesting service. The overall go l is again to determine thefixedpriceu and powerP (remember that we look for astaticpricing) that maximize thexpectedbase station
revenue. To reach this goal, we first need to look at the numberof users for each possible level of
demand (exceeding capacity or not), whatever the choice ofu andP .
Theorem 3 Let u andP be the per-packet price and received power at the base station. Let be
the number of users potentially requesting service. The actual number of number of users at
equilibrium is  = min(;K);
withK being the value found in Theorem 1 when demand exceeds capacity.
The proof of this theorem is in Appendix D.
The average base station revenue is expressed by:R(u; P ) = 1X=0 u(u; P; )(u; P; )IP ( = ) (11)
where(u; P; ) (resp.(u; P; )) is the number of open connections (resp. the throughput) when
per-packet price isu, received power isP and potential demand is.
The goal of the base station is, again, to find a priceu and a powerP that maximize the expected
revenue, representing this revenue over long periods of time. For instance, assume that demand
follows a Poisson distribution with rate3, the other parameters being the same than for the example
when demand exceeds capacity. By using standard optimization tools we get the optimal valuesu = 0:4905, P  = 2:2694 and the maximum average revenueR = 299:2589. This is sketched in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Average revenue of the base station in terms of the per-packet price and the received power
when demand is random and delay is the metrics of interest.
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4 Optimal pricing for two classes of users
Consider now two different classes of applications with different quality of service valuation for
which we want to differentiate services. For convenience, th se classes are called type-v and type-d.
Here again, we assume that the service valuation for each type of application depends of theSINR
obtained. This is given byfv(SINRv(Kv;Kd)) (resp. fd(SINRd(Kv;Kd))) for type-v (resp.
type-d) users. Therefore, ifuv (resp.ud) is the per-packet price for type-v (resp. type-d), the utility
functions for each type are8i 2 fv; dg; Ui(Kv;Kd) = fi(SINRi(Kv;Kd))  ui:
TheSINRs, obtained from (1), are given bySINRv(Kv;Kd) = PvNv(Kv   1)Pv + KdPd + 2 ;SINRd(Kv;Kd) = PdNdKvPv + (Kd   1)Pd + 2 ;
and, as it can be readily checked, the utility function of a type of users depends on the number of
active users of the other type.
Again, we assume that there is a capacity constraint at the bas st tion for each class, given by
(5). These requirements lead toKv < 1   2Pv  KdPdPv + 1 (for class-v);Kv < 1   2Pv  KdPdPv + PdPv (for class-d);
or just Kv < 1   2Pv  KdPdPv + 1 + Pd   PvPv 1lPd<Pv (12)
where1l is for the indicator function.
4.1 Demand exceeding capacity
We again first assume that the number of users potentially applying for service is infinite in each
type of application. The case of random demand is studied in the ext subsection.
We assume users act selfishly and apply for service as soon as their utility is positive. Also, they
leave the game if their utility becomes negative. Again, as in the single class case, the base station
blocks connections from users if the capacity constraint (12) is reached.
The following theorem shows that a Nash equilibrium exists for the number of users of each
type, when considering that all users are selfish. The theorem expresses this equilibrium in terms of
prices and received powers for each class of service.
PI n ˚ 1731
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Theorem 4 With the above assumptions, there is a (Nash) equilibrium(Kv ;Kd) for the numberKv andKd of active type-v and type-d users. The values ofKv andKd depend on received powersPv ; Pd and pricesuv; ud in the following fashion:
1. If Uv(1; 0)  0 , uv  fv  NvPv2  andUd(0; 1)  0 , ud  fd  NdPd2 , no user is
interested in requesting service, so that(Kv ;Kd) = (0; 0):
2. If Uv(1; 0)  0 , uv  fv  NvPv2  but Ud(0; 1) > 0, only type-d users are present at
equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium is(0;Kd) withKd = ( 1  2Pd   Ndf 1d (ud) ; iffd(NdPd2 ) < ud < fd(NdPd2 );1 + 1  2Pd ; otherwise: (13)
3. On the other hand, ifUd(0; 1)  0 , ud  fd  NdPd2  butUv(1; 0) > 0, only type-v users
are present and the Nash equilibrium is(Kv ; 0) withKv = ( 1  2Pv   Nvf 1v (uv) ; iffv(NvPv2 ) < uv < fv(NvPv2 );1 + 1  2Pv ; otherwise: (14)
4. If Uv(1; 0) > 0 andUd(0; 1) > 0, there are 3 subcases.
(a) If 2 + Pv + (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv  min NdPdf 1d (ud) + Pd; NvPvf 1v (uv) + Pv, the capacity
constraint (12) is reached while users of both classes stillwant to request service. The
system then chooses to accept only class-d u ers ifud > PdcvPvcd uv, or only class-v users
otherwise in order to give priority to users providing the hig est revenue, with8i 2fv; dg the throughput at capacityci = rRcNi  1  e  NiPi2=+(Pj Pi)1lPj<Pi !Lr :
The equilibrium is thus(0;Kd) with Kd = 1 + 1  2Pd if ud > PdcvPvcduv, and(Kv ; 0)
withKv = 1 + 1  2Pv otherwise.
(b) If NdPdf 1d (ud) +Pd < min2 +Pv+ (Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv ; NvPvf 1v (uv) +Pv, the equilibrium
is (Kv ; 0) withKv defined in (14).
(c) Else if NvPvf 1v (uv) + Pv < min NdPdf 1d (ud) + Pd; 2+ Pv + (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv, the
equilibrium is(0;Kd) withKd defined in (13).
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This theorem is proved in Appendix E.
It can be observed that, at equilibrium, only one type of application is in service when demand
exceeds capacity.
Knowing this equilibrium, one can obtain the values of prices uv; ud and the received powerP v ; P d that maximizes the network revenue.
Theorem 5 The maximum revenue of the base station isR = max(Rv ; Rd);
whereRv (resp. Rd) is the maximum revenue when there are only class-v (resp. class-d) users,
provided by Theorem 2 (single-class case).
Let i 2 fv; dg such thatRi = R and j 2 fv; dg such thatj 6= i. The class-i optimal per-
packet price isui = fi(X) and the optimal received powerP i = X2Ni where class-i is used in
Theorem 2 to obtainX.
Valuesuj andP j for the other class must be chosen so that only class-i u ers are present at
equilibrium, that is, they should verify8P j > 0uj 2 [0;min(P j ciP i cj ui ; fj(P j Nj2 ))[[[fj(P j Nj2 );+1[:
The proof is provided in Appendix F.
As an illustration, consider again the case where the valuation depends on the average delay
for each class. We use the same numerical values than in the case of a single class, those values
corresponding to type-d users. We additionally use the following processing gainNv = 8 and the
delay sensitivityv = 2, so that voice users value more small delays. It turns out that, at equilibrium,
only type-v users are present, providing a revenueR = 574:063, obtained for valuesuv = 0:63
andP v = 2:74.
The revenue is thus maximized when there is only one class of uer in the system at equilibri-
um. This result is based on the strong assumption that potential demand always exceeds capacity.
Though, it is likely that at some point of time, demand is lessthan capacity. This occurs for instance
during the evening. In the next section, we assume that demand follows a random variable, and we
keep the idea of having static (fixed) prices (as well as receiv d powers). Therefore, keeping two
classes of service is useful, both classes being served, butthe most important one getting all resource
in case of congestion.
4.2 Random Demand
We assume that8i 2 fv; dg, i defines the (discrete) random demand for type-i users. Given the
valuesi of random variablesi, an equilibrium exists for the numbersv andd of type-v and
type-d users.
Theorem 6 Assuming now that potential demand isv andd for type-v and type-d users respec-
tively and that it does not necessarily exceed capacity, there is a (Nash) equilibrium(v; d) for the
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numbersv andd of active type-v and type-d users. The values ofv andd depend on received
powersPv; Pd, pricesuv; ud, and potential demandv; d in the following way:
1. if (v = 0 or Uv(1; 0)  0 , uv  fv  NvPv2 ) and (d = 0 or Ud(0; 1)  0 , ud fd  NdPd2 ), no user has interest in requesting service, so that(v ; d) = (0; 0):
2. If v = 0 or Uv(1; 0)  0, uv  fv  NvPv2  butd > 0 andUd(0; 1) > 0, only type-d users
are present at equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium is(0; d) withd = min(d;Kd); (15)Kd being taken from (13).
3. On the other hand, ifd = 0 or Ud(0; 1)  0, ud  fd  NdPd2  but v > 0 andUv(1; 0) >0, only type-v users are present and the Nash equilibrium is(v; 0) withv = min(v;Kv ); (16)Kv being taken from (14).
4. If the total demand is less than what capacity can support and it still yields positive utilities,
that is if v < 1  2Pv   d PdPv + 1 + Pd PvPv 1lPd<Pv , Uv(v ; d) > 0 andUd(v ; d) > 0, all
users are served, i.e.,(v; d) = (v; d):
5. Otherwise, ifv ; d > 0, Uv(1; 0) > 0, andUd(0; 1) > 0, there are 3 subcases.
(a) If 2 +Pv +(Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv  min NdPdf 1d (ud) + Pd; NvPvf 1v (uv) + Pv, capacity con-
straint (12) (and potential demand constraints(v ; d)) are reached while users of both
classes still have interest to request for service. The system then decides to give prefer-
ence to class-d users ifud > PdcvPvcduv or to class-v users otherwise in order to prioritize
users that provide a higher revenue.
The equilibrium is thus(v; d) with d = min(d; 1 + 1  2Pd ) andv = 1  2 +Pv+(Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv dPdPv if ud >PdcvPvcduv, v = min(v; 1 + 1  2Pv ) andd = 1  2 +Pv+(Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv vPvPd otherwise.
(b) If NdPdf 1d (ud) +Pd < min2 +Pv+ (Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv ; NvPvf 1v (uv) +Pv, the equilibrium
is (v ; 0) with v defined in (16).
(c) Else if NvPvf 1v (uv) + Pv < min NdPdf 1d (ud)+ Pd; 2 + Pv + (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv, the
equilibrium is(0; d) with d defined in (15).
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The proof follows exactly that of Theorem 4, just adding demand constraintsv andd to capacity
constraints.
In the current case of two classes, the average base station reve ue is expressed by:R(uv ; Pv; ud; Pd) = 1Xv=0 1Xd=0  uvv(uv; Pv ; v; ud; Pd; d)v(uv; Pv ; v; ud; Pd; d) ++udd(uv; Pv ; v; ud; Pd; d)d(uv ; Pv; v ; ud; Pd; d)IP (v = v ;d = d);
where8i 2 fv; dg, i (u; P; ) (resp.i(u; P; )) is the number of type-i open connections (resp.
the throughput) when per-packet prices areuv; uv, received powersPv ; Pd and potential demand isv; d.
As an illustration, we look at the case where demand follows aPoisson distribution with rate2
for type-v traffic and3 for type-d. We consider also the following parameters:Nd = 10, Nv = 8,d = 1:6 andv = 2. This choice gives the optimal valuesuv = 0:638, ud = 0:484, P v = 2:635,P d = 2:177 and maximum average revenueR = 504:836. We plot in Figure 3 (resp. 4) the
average revenue in terms of type-d (resp. type-v) users received power and per-packet price with
optimal type-v (resp. type-d) parameters.
0 
1
2
3
4
5
0  
.2
.4  
.6 
.8  
1
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
P
d
u
d
A
ve
ra
ge
 r
ev
en
ue
Figure 3: Average base station revenue in terms of type-d users received powerPd and per-packet
priceud with optimal type-v received powerP v and per-packet priceuv.
The same thing is performed in Figures 5 and 6, but with their respective powers and prices
varying. The values in the figures are in accordance with the optimal value found.
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Figure 4: Average base station revenue in terms of type-v users received powerPv and per-packet
priceuv when type-d parameters are fixed toP d andud.
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Figure 5: Average base station revenue in terms of received powersPv andPd with prices fixed to
optimal valuesuv andud.
5 Conclusions
We have investigated in this paper a new pricing scheme for DS-C MA communications, allowing
service differentiation. With respect to the schemes developed in the literature, we have chosen a
static and predictable per-packet price that, we believe, is more likely to be accepted by users. The
base station (assuming perfect power control) controls twovariables per class: the price and received
power. For fixed values, we have found the number of users applying for service at equilibrium,
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Figure 6: Average base station revenue in terms of per-packet pric suv andud with received powers
fixed to optimal valuesP v andP d .
whatever demand is. We have also looked at the price and powervalues that maximize the revenue
at the base station. Our findings show that, when demand exceeds apacity, one type of service will
get the priority. On the other hand, assuming a more likely random demand, we have illustrated that
both classes will be served.
As extensions of our results, we would like to look at the casewh re users are not continuously
active, but their activity follow a random variable [10].
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We consider that the per-packet priceu and received powerP are fixed. The goal is to find an
equilibrium number of sourcesK such that no additional users will have an incentive to join the
system (and somehow no present users will want to leave). This means that we are looking for a
valueK such that U(1)  0 andK = 0, or U(K) > 0 andK = 1  2P + 1 (this last equality corresponding to the case where
capacity is reached in (5)), orU(K) = 0 and0 < K < 1  2P + 1.
The equalityU(K) = 0 is equivalent tof(SINR(K)) = u, or SINR(K) = PN(K 1)P+2 =f 1(u). Since theSINR is a strictly decreasing function of the number of sources, the equation has
a (unique) solution if the maximalSINR when there is only one userSINR(1) is abovef 1(u)
and the SINR at capacity constraint is underf 1(u). The first condition defines the maximal priceumax = f(SINR(1)) = f(NP=2) above which no user will enter (K = 0) the system, since his
utility will always be negative. The second (capacity) condition defines a pricef(SINR( 1  2P +1)) = f(NP2 ) above which the number of sources is less than what capacity allows. If this is not
verified, If the price is higher than this threshold, capacity is reached, leading to the third equilibrium
case described in the theorem (new customers are not allowedt enter ven of their utility is positive).
If f(NP2 ) < u < umax, the numberK of sources satisfiesf(SINR(K)) = u, that isK = 1  2P   Nf 1(u) .
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B Proof of Theorem 2
The base station revenue is R(u; P ) = uK(u; P )(u; P ):
From Theorem 1, we have 3 subdomains for the expression ofK in terms of(u; P ) (as illustrated
in Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Three equilibrium domains (“nobody” in area A, “full capacity” in area C, or “null utility”
in area B) for the number of active users as a function of priceu and powerP . In the region of(u; p) such thatf(NP2 ) < u < f(NP2 ) (where users get null utility),K(u; P ) = 1   2P   Nf 1(u) from Theorem 1. Inserting this in the expression of the
average throughput (9) we getR(u; P ) = u1  2P   Nf 1(u) rRcN 1  e f 1(u)Lr : (17)
This function is continuous and differentiable in both of its variables and it is easy to check
that8u; P @R@P (u; P ) = u2P 2 > 0:
Therefore, the revenue over the domainf(NP2 ) < u < f(NP2 ) () 2N f 1(u) < P <2Nf 1(u) is such thatP = 2Nf 1(u), i.e.,u = f(NP2 ), meaning that price and power are
configured such that full capacity is reached. In the region such thatf(NP2 ) > u (full capacity reached and positive utility meaning that
no other user is allowed to enter), Theorem 1 givesK(u; P ) = 1 + 1  2P leading to the
expression of the revenue:R(u; P ) = u1 + 1   2P  rRcN 1  e  PN2 Lr : (18)
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This function is also continuous and differentiable such that@R@u (u; P ) = 1 + 1   2P  rRcN 1  e  PN2 Lr > 0:
Again, a maximum over this region is thus necessarily at a point (u; P ) such thatu = f(NP2 );
on the border such that the utility is zero. Over the third regionu > umax = f(NP2 ), K = 0 leading to no revenue.
From what is above, the maximum is necessary on the curve of maximal capacityu = f(NP2 ),
where the revenue is expressed in terms ofP byR(P ) = R(f(NP2 ); P ) = f(NP2 )1 + 1   2P  rRcN 1  e  PN2 Lr : (19)
This function is continuous and differentiable over[0;+1). Defining the variableX = NP2 , the
revenue can be rewritten asR1(X) = R(P ) = rRcN (1  e X)Lrf(X) +1   rRc (1  e X)Lrf(X)X :
Equation@R@P (P ) = 0 is equivalent to@R1@X (X) = 0 because@X@P = N2  6= 0. Also,@R1@X (X) = rRcN (Lre X (1  e X)Lr 1f(X) +(1  e X)Lrf 0(X)) + 1   rRc LrX(1  e X)Lr 1f(X)X2 +X(1  e X)Lrf 0(X)X2   (1  e X)Lrf(X)X2 :
After some computations,@R1@X (X) = 0 if and only iff(X)  X2Lre X +XN(1  )Lr  N(1  e X)+f 0(X)  X2(1  e X) +XN(1  e X) = 0:
Denoting byX the set of solutions, we obtain prove the theorem.
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C Proof of Corollary 1
The following lemma will be helpful to prove the corollary.
Lemma 1 Leta andb be real numbers such that> 0 andb > 1. The equationaX2 + bX + 1 = eX ;
has a unique strictly positive solution.
Proof DefineF (X) = aX2 + bX + 1   eX . We haveF (0) = 0, limX!1 F (X) =  1,F 0(X) = 2aX + b with F 0(0) = b  1 > 0, andF 00(X) = 2a  eX . If 2a < 1, F 0 is strictly decreasing over[0;1) (fromF 00 < 0). SinceF 0(0) > 0, there is only
one strictly positive solution to the equation. If 2a  1, F 0 is first increasing, withF 0(0) > 0, then strictly decreasing to 1 whenX ! 1. ThusF is first increasing and positive (sinceF (0) = 0), then decreasing to 1,
meaning that there is a unique solution toF (X) = 0.
The result follows.
We can then prove the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using the specific functionf corresponding to delay, (10) becomes,Lr(1 + )X2 + 1   Lr(1 + )NX + (1  )N = 1   NeX : (20)
This can be rewritten, withY = X asaY 2 + bY + 1 = eY ;
wherea = Lr(1 + ) (1 )N andb = Lr(1 + ). We havea > 0 and b > 1 becauseb =Lr(1 + ) > Lr and sinceLr, the number of information bytes per packet is typically more than
1 in communication systems. From Lemma 1, (20) has a unique sol tion X overX > 0. Then,
Theorem 2 gives the optimal per-packet priceu = ( RcLN )(1  e X)Lr;
and the optimal received power isP  = X2N :
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D Proof of Theorem 3
The per-packet price and the received power are fixed tou andP . Assume that, at a given time, the
potential number of users is. There are several situations: If  = 0, there is no demand, so that the actual number of users is  = 0. If  > K (K being the equilibrium value when demand exceeds capacity),assume that
there are alreadyK customers in communication. IfK < K (resp. K < K  ), the
number of active sessions increases (resp. decreases) exactly in the same way as in the case
where demand exceeds capacity (see the proof of Theorem A) since users have a positive
(resp. negative) utility, so that finally = K. If   K, all users, up to full demand are served and have positive utility. This means that
they all ask for service. Thus, = .
This proves the theorem.
E Proof of Theorem 4
The proof studies different cases.
1. If Uv(1; 0)  0 , uv  fv  NvPv2  andUd(0; 1)  0 , ud  fd  NdPd2 , no user has
interest in requesting service when the base station is idles nce an entering user will get a
negative utility. Additionally, knowing thatUd andUv are decreasing functions in both of
their variablesKv andKd, this result also holds for all couple(Kv ;Kd). Therefore,(Kv ;Kd) = (0; 0):
2. If Uv(1; 0)  0 , uv  fv  NvPv2  butUd(0; 1) > 0, only type-d users apply for service,
sinceUv(Kv ;Kv)  0 8(Kv;Kd). As a consequence, we are in the case of a single class
studied in Theorem 1, leading to the result.
3. If Ud(0; 1)  0 , ud  fd  NdPd2  butUv(1; 0) > 0, we follow exactly the same line of
argument, switching type-v and type-d.
4. If Uv(1; 0) > 0 andUd(0; 1) > 0, users of both types can apply for service.
The Capacity constraint (12) can be rewritten as the linear rl tion between the number of
users KvPv +KdPd = 1   2 + Pv + (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv :
Note also that relationsUd(Kv ;Kd) = 0 andUv(Kv;Kd) = 0 can be rewrittenUd(Kv;Kd) = 0 iKvPv +KdPd = NdPdf 1d (ud)   2 + Pd:
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and Uv(Kv;Kd) = 0 iKvPv +KdPd = NvPvf 1v (uv)   2 + Pv:
These equations define threeparallel lines. The equilibrium depends on the ordering of those
lines.
(a) If 2 + Pv + (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv  min NdPdf 1d (ud) + Pd; NvPvf 1v (uv) + Pv, the capacity
constraint (12) defines the lowest curve (case (a) of Figure 8). Thus, users apply for
service until capacity is reached, so thatKvPv +KdPd = 1   2 + Pv + (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv : (21)
The base station decides which users to accept and which users to r ject. We follow here
the policy that the base station chooses users that will resut in a larger revenue. The
revenue isKvvuv +Kddud = Kd(udd   uvv PdPv ) + uvv(1   2Pv + 1 + Pd   PvPv 1lPd<Pv)
using relation (21), where the throughputsv andd arecv = rRcNv (1  e  NvPv2=+(Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv )Lr
and cd = rRcNd (1  e  NdPd2=+(Pv Pd)1lPv<Pd )Lr;
and they do not depend onKd andKv. The revenue is thus linear inKd and the optimal
value depends on the sign ofudcd   uvcv PdPv . This provides the result.
(b) If NdPdf 1d (ud) + Pd < min2 + Pv+ (Pd   Pv)1lPd<Pv ; NvPvf 1v (uv) + Pv, the curveUd(Kv ;Kd) = 0 is the lowest one. (cases (d) and (e) of Figure 8). Then users enter the
system until this curve is reached. Yet, type-v users have positive utility, so they continue
to enter. At the same time, the utility of type-d users becomes negative so that some of
them leave. We therefore slide on the curveUd(Kv;Kd) = 0 until Kd = 0. ThenKv
still increases until capacity is reached (case (d) of Figure 8) orUv(Kv;Kd) = 0 (case
(e) of Figure 8).
The equilibrium is thus(Kv ; 0) with Kv defined in (14).
(c) Else if NvPvf 1v (uv) +Pv < min NdPdf 1d (ud) +Pd; 2 +Pv +(Pd Pv)1lPd<Pv, the result
follows by a similar argument, switching just type-v and type-d (cases (b) and (c) of
Figure 8).
This concludes the proof.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium depending on prices and received powers in the case where demand exceeds
capacity. The dashed line represents the capacity constrait. CurveU0v is forUv(Kv;Kd) = 0 while
curveU0d is forUd(Kv ;Kd) = 0. Circled points indicate the Nash equilibria.
PI n ˚ 1731
26 Hayel & Ramos & Tuffin
F Proof of Theorem 5
Following Theorem 4, there is only one type of user at equilibrium. Thus we shall choose the typei 2 fv; dg soRi = max(Rv;Rd). From Theorem 2 for the case of a single class, this is given byui = fi(X) and P i = X2Ni ;
with X defined by:X = argmaxX2X rRcN (1  e X)Lrfi(X) + 1   rRc (1  e X)Lrfi(X)X :
Though, the values ofuj andP j with j 2 fv; dg, j 6= i, are chosen from Theorem 4 so that only
class-i users are present at equilibrium. This is provided by the range of values given in the theorem.
Irisa
